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SUBJECT: JOINT WEEKA NO. 3

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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EXTERNAL - POLITICAL

1. Bloc Unity. The appearance of a large number of articles, which sought to prove that Soviet ideological positions are correct and are menaced not only by the imperialist archenemy and the Albanians but apparently by others within the Communist movement, created an impression that Soviet-Chinese Communist relations are entering a period of heightened tension. The articles treated the avoidance of nuclear war and the related Soviet policies of increasing contacts with western governments as the only rational and orthodox course. There were hints in some articles that failure to accept the Soviet ideological formulation of the central question of "peaceful coexistence" would lead to a split in the bloc. Although China was nowhere explicitly mentioned, there were hints that it is the main object of the attacks. One of these was a plain refutation of Mao Tse-Tung's "paper tiger" thesis in a Pravda article by Inozemtsev. While the arguments in most articles are not notably original and lack the forcefulness of some of Khrushchev's published speeches, especially the one he delivered at the 1960 Bucharest bloc meeting, the extent of the current propaganda campaign far exceeds that which occurred in the USSR in the summer and autumn of 1960 and which trailed off after the truce between Moscow and Peiping at the 1960 Communist Party Conference.

The Soviet press failed to take notice of all Chinese Communist ideological pronouncements and even somewhat misleadingly reported the publication of the 22nd CPSU Congress documents in China. The Soviet press also reported that negotiations are under way on the 1962 Soviet-Chinese cultural exchange program. This, added to reports last week that trade negotiations between the USSR and China are in progress, might indicate that Soviet-Chinese relations were normal. But there are probably few Soviet citizens who are not conscious that things are far from normal and smooth in these relations.

2. Berlin/Germany. Ambassador THOMPSON's second meeting with GROMYKO on January 12, as in the case of his first meeting, has not been reported in the Soviet press.

Almost the only material to appear during the week regarding Germany has been in the form of continued propaganda attacks against NATO General HEUSINGER. This material has relied on reiterating the charges first released at the December press conference, and continues to fail to prove the validity of the Soviet charges. In spite of this fact, however, latent anti-German sentiments within the Soviet population appear to have been revived as the result of the current campaign, according to German diplomats here who report increased personal hostility by Soviet citizens toward themselves and their families.

The United States military operation "Long Thrust" has been reported by several Soviet papers in some detail, but without any significant comment.

Routine attacks against alleged provocations in West Berlin also continued to appear. Izvestiya, for example, on January 18 denounced the reported plans of Chancellor ADENAUER to visit West Berlin on January 25.

3. Laos. Pathet Lao leader Prince SOUPHANUVONG passed through Moscow on his way to join BOUN OUM and SOUVANNA PHOUMA in Geneva. The Soviet press continued to criticize Boun Oum's attitude and to charge that he is refusing to discuss the key question of the formation of a coalition government. His attitude, the Soviet press warned, is jeopardizing the present Geneva meeting and the outlook for a peaceful resolution in Laos. One paper reported that an agreement had been concluded between the Chinese Communists and "the Kingdom of Laos" providing for the construction of a major highway from Yunnan Province to Phong Saly.

4. Soviet Reaction to the Common Market--Criticism of Austria. Although the Soviet information media continued to adhere largely to the policy of not mentioning the Common Market, the successful resolution this week of the agricultural question and emergence of evidence that the US intends to establish a common trade policy moved the Soviets to attack the Common Market. Pravda referred to the Common Market for the first time as a threat to the Soviet Union. Press commentary, however, continued to stress the contradictions between Western economic interests and the barriers to genuine cooperation within the Common Market.

A sharp attack on neo-Nazi activities in Austria was published in Pravda on January 16. The article asked why the Austrian Government had failed to adopt measures preventing such activities "which are incompatible with State Treaty provisions." The article also complained about West German economic influence in Austria and the support which it supposedly renders to "anti-neutral groups." It seemed clear that the attack was designed to remind the Austrians of Soviet opposition to any association with the Common Market.

5. Finnish Elections. The Soviet press hailed the outcome of the Finnish elections as a victory for the supporters of a policy of strong Finnish-Soviet friendship. The Soviet papers also took obvious pleasure from the fact that the Communist party of Finland (although not identified as such in Soviet press communiques) gained a substantial increase in votes, and the main losers were those who are supposed to be opposed to continuing the PASAKIVI-KEKKONEN policy.

6. Soviet Propaganda on the January 22 OAS Meeting. The impending meeting of the Organization of American States attracted a steadily increasing volume of propaganda treatment during the week. The main themes in this material were that the people of Latin America are in full sympathy with Cuba, and those governments which are not "subservient" to Washington (including Brazil, Mexico, Argentina, Chile, Bolivia, and Ecuador) are opposed to any intervention in Cuban affairs. CASTRO's counter-demonstration scheduled to be held in Havana on January 22 has been reported as attracting growing support throughout South America. However, on the whole, Soviet press treatment of the forthcoming meeting suggests that Moscow considers it likely to result in actions adverse to the Castro regime.

7. State of Union Message. Initial reaction to the President's State of the Union message characterized the speech as disappointing and noted that it left the impression that ruling circles in the US had not given up the old

positions-of-strength policy. Pravda's commentator on January 15 focused on the President's presentation of post-war international relations as global civil war and asserted that this represents non-recognition by influential circles in the US of peaceful coexistence, which is the only possible means of preserving peace. It was of interest that the negative judgments were addressed to "ruling circles" or "influences" in the US and not to the President himself.

8. Congo. A TASS despatch from New York published in Pravda on January 16 took sharp issue with U Thant's decision ordering UN troops to restore order in Oriental Province. In the Soviet view, this action constituted a "crude interference" in the internal affairs of the Congolese Republic and was apparently designed to distract attention from Katanga, where the UN was failing to carry out the Security Council Resolution of November 24. The TASS article contended that the UN move in Oriental Province was instigated by the American delegation and surprisingly taken up by the leadership in the UN Secretariat.

Comment: The tone of the TASS despatch reflected some disenchantment with U Thant and could foreshadow stronger attacks against him should UN actions against Gizenga destroy the latter's political effectiveness.

9. Nuclear Testing. On the eve of the resumption of the nuclear test talks in Geneva, Pravda carried a special commentary clearly implying that the success of the talks would in large measure depend upon Western acceptance of the Soviet proposals of November 28. The commentary asserted that the Soviet proposals were constructive and realistic and based on the knowledge that national means are adequate for the detection of all tests, including those which might be conducted underground. Nevertheless, the Soviets were willing to consider the question of underground testing separately in accordance with the Soviet proposals that all members of the atomic club desist from underground testing while a system of international control was worked out in the context of the general disarmament negotiations.

It seemed clear from the commentary that Soviet strategy at the talks would be to focus attention on their proposals while ignoring or rejecting the international control provision specified in the draft treaty tabled by the US and the UK.

10. South Vietnam. On January 4, the Chairmen of the two chambers of the USSR Supreme Soviet addressed a letter to the Chairman of the DRV National Assembly Standing Committee stating that recent actions of US ruling circles in South Vietnam indicate a willingness to resort to any means, including direct intervention to preserve the bankrupt regime which is trying to suppress the national liberation movement. The letter, which was written in response to an appeal by the Standing Committee of the DRV National Assembly, was published in Pravda on January 13. The communication added that the USSR could not remain an indifferent witness and would support the demand of the people of Vietnam for peaceful reunification in accordance with the Geneva agreements.

COMMENT: It was notable that the letter by the two Soviet chairmen, Lobanov and Peive, was long overdue and signed by legislative rather than executive representatives of the Soviet Government. These circumstances and the relatively

moderate nature of the protest suggest that the Soviets are still approaching the Vietnamese situation with caution, presumably not wishing to encourage the DRV to move too fast.

11. New Guinea. In reporting on the engagement which took place between Dutch and Indonesian naval units, it was not unexpected that the Soviet press should accept the Indonesian interpretation of the event. The Soviets cited the remarks of Indonesian General Jani, who claimed that Indonesian vessels were attacked by the Dutch in Indonesian waters and that appropriate counter measures would be taken by his government.

12. Mikoyan Visit to Ghana. Mikoyan's activities and remarks in Ghana were extensively treated in the Soviet press. From this vantage point, it was especially interesting that Mikoyan should have visited the headquarters of the Convention Peoples Party and there extended the warm greetings of the CPSU. It also appeared noteworthy that Mikoyan in his visit to the Kwame Nkrumah Party School spoke favorably of Nkrumah's brand of "African Socialism," which appeared to be an implicit reaffirmation of the idea of separate roads to socialism. The overall impression gained through Soviet press coverage was that Mikoyan's visit was a great success and that the Soviets have reason to be encouraged by the prospects of continued good relations on a state and, perhaps, even a party level.

INTERNAL - POLITICAL

13. Leadership. The stir of speculation aroused by the Soviet Foreign Ministry announcement that V. M. MOLOTOV was on his way back to Vienna (Jan.8) subsided as the days passed and Molotov stayed put, presumably in Moscow. Even after Foreign Ministry spokesmen on February 9 "corrected" the announcement that Molotov had left Moscow on January 6, they gave Western correspondents to understand that the leader of the "anti-Party group" might still return to his post and that his date of departure was only a matter of timing. Newsmen covered the departure of the Vienna train on January 15 and 17, but Molotov was not on it. Following the initial two days of confusing announcements, the Foreign Ministry Press Department relapsed into its traditional silence, responding to the daily inquiries of Western newsmen by pleading ignorance of Molotov's plans. Observers were thus left to speculate whether there had been an unprecedented, high-level slip in the customarily tight-lipped Ministry of Foreign Affairs, or whether there had in fact been a decision during the first week of January to send Molotov back to Vienna, which had subsequently been countermanded.

While they were vainly waiting at the train, foreign observers were given additional food for thought by the uneven treatment A. I. MIKOYAN received in the Soviet press on January 15-16. In a fashion that was momentarily reminiscent of the title-juggling to which he had been subjected in May, 1960, Izvestiya and Pravda in their issues of January 15 and 16, respectively, dropped Mikoyan's title of First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers from TASS stories about his travels in Ghana. Some of the other Moscow-area newspapers failed to carry stories on him at all in their January 16 issues. Those that did followed the lead of the two authoritative press organs in omitting his title, with the

exception of Komsomolskaya Pravda, which published a story by its special correspondent referring in one place to him as a simple "Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR".

The omissions of January 15-16 were repaired on January 17, when both Pravda and Izvestiya restored Mikoyan's full title in their coverage of his departure from Accra and arrival in Bamako.

The incident lent some poignancy to Mikoyan's statement of January 12 in Accra, in answer to Kwame NKRUMAH's address of welcome. Mikoyan found occasion to say: "You all know well that we have a collective leadership. Inasmuch as I am a member of that collective, I thank you for what you have said about us" (Pravda, January 14).

On the heels of all this, it was perhaps not surprising to find significant differences of view expressed in the articles published in all Moscow-area newspapers on January 18 in commemoration of the 50th anniversary of the Prague Conference of the Russian Social-Democratic Labor Party, at which LENIN had severed the last organizational ties that bound the Bolsheviks to the Mensheviks.

The tone for these articles appeared to have been set by the authoritative essay of Party ideologist P.N.POSPELOV, who had lost his post as candidate-member of the Presidium of the CC-CPSU following the XXII Congress, but remained in the important position of Director of the Central Committee's Institute of Marxism-Leninism, the highest Party school.

Pospelov's article re-hashes the treatment of the Prague Conference contained in the 1959 "History of the CPSU" and makes two principal points about it. (1) The Conference "adopted a resolution on the expulsion from the Party of the liquidators", who, "by their conduct, 'had definitively placed themselves outside the Party'" (emphasis in original). (2) "The Bolsheviks gave the revolutionary elements of other socialist parties an example of relentless struggle against opportunism to the point of a complete organizational break."

If point (2) appears to allude to the Soviet-Albanian quarrel and to the Soviet-Chinese dispute of which that is the symbol, point (1) appears no less clearly to allude to the question of what to do about today's fractionaries, the "anti-Party group of Molotov, Kaganovich, and Malenkov." That this is in fact the case appears to be shown by the emphasis placed upon the exclusion of fractionaries in most of the articles appearing in the Moscow-area press, beginning with Pospelov's.

There is, however, one exception to the rule. The article on the Prague Conference which appears in the trade-union organ Trud finds that meeting's principal significance to lie, not in the fact that it cleansed the ranks of the Party of the "opportunistic" fractionaries, but in its "election of a united and cohesive Central Committee, which stood firmly on Leninist positions." Relating the significance of the Conference to the present day, the Trud article says: We are marking the 50th anniversary of the Prague Conference during the exciting days, passing under the sign of the decisions of the XXII Congress of the CPSU, which adopted a new Program of the Party, the Communist Manifesto

of our epoch. The elaboration and adoption of the new Program is indissolubly linked with the consistent, principled struggle of our Party for the restoration of Leninist norms of Party life and of the principles of collective leadership; with the unremitting struggle of the Party, of its Leninist Central Committee, headed by N. S. Khrushchev, against the cult of personality and its consequences."

The Prague Conference articles in all probability constitute a sign that the debate on the exclusion of the "anti-Party group" from the CPSU continues, and this, in turn, no doubt explains the failure of V. M. Molotov to leave for Vienna.

Meanwhile, N. S. Khrushchev himself appears not to have returned to Moscow following the conclusion on January 12 of the Minsk agricultural conference. He may be availing himself of the good advice of that experienced ex-fractionary, W. GOMULKA.

14. March 18 Election: Establishment of Election Commissions Nearly Complete at All Levels. The task of appointing election commissions at all levels in the USSR for the March 18 elections to the USSR Supreme Soviet is nearing completion(WEEKA NO. 2, January 12, 1962). Since one of the primary functions of these commissions is to certify candidates, the regime is now prepared for the discussion of candidates' qualifications before their "nomination" This process has already begun in the 784 election districts of the Council of the Union.

The 784 election districts were defined by a ukase of January 6, 1962, in conformity with article 34 of the Constitution, which provides for representation in the Council of the Union on the basis of one deputy for every 300,000 citizens (Moskovskaya Pravda, Jan. 7). The most recent Soviet population estimate is 220 million (Pravda, Jan. 8, 1962). Yet, calculating on the basis of 784 districts, representation is being given to 235,200,000 people, or 15 million too many, one more example that the Soviet Constitution is not to be taken too literally (WEEKA NO. 50,Dec. 15,1961).

The Communist Party, one of the five public bodies legally authorized to nominate, is currently permitting the limelight to play a little more brightly on its front organizations. Accordingly, the pattern appearing thus far is that the chairman of the election commission is usually a trade-unionist, and only a minority of the members are directly identified in the press by their Party connections. Under the provisions of a new law, the chairmen and secretaries of election commissions are permitted to take time off from their jobs, with pay, for 30 days before the election (Vedomosti SS, USSR, No. 1, 1961).

It is interesting to note that among the Party members of the election commissions, there is usually one from the "Party organs" section of the local apparatus. That these key personnel are in a position to exercise guidance on behalf of the Party's Central organs during the nominating process now under way, is suggested by the convening on January 17 in Moscow of a CPSU-CC conference on organizational-Party work, which is being attended by important Party workers from all over the USSR (Leninskoye Znamya, January 18, 1962). This meeting has been addressed by three top men from the Party-organs section of the Central Committee apparatus: V. N. TITOV, M. A. POLEKHIN, and P. F. PIGALEV.

15. Trial of Lithuanian Roman Catholic Churchmen Heady with Anti-Semitic Overtones. The Soviet press has published several reports of the criminal proceedings now in progress against the bishop and vicar of a Roman Catholic Church in Klaypeda, Lithuania (Pravda, January 16). The priests are accused of duping the faithful by collecting excessive amounts of money for building a church. They are said to have then used the surplus money for speculation. They are also accused of having received contraband dollars in packages from three Catholic priests in the United States who are said to have had associations with the German occupation forces in the Baltic states during the War.

In an article published in Trud, January 16, the majority of the persons accused of involvement in the currency aspects of the case are easily identifiable as Jews, either by their names, the relationships described in the article, or the contacts they are said to have had with persons in Israel or other Jews. The heavy anti-Semitic overtones of the affair are accentuated by the charge that the local Jewish rabbi acted as arbiter of disputes arising among the currency speculators.

True or not, the charges in the Klaypeda case provide the Soviet propaganda mill with several useful propaganda themes: (1) contacts with emigres or emigre organizations can be dangerous for the individuals concerned, (2) the Catholic Church hoodwinks its people, (3) the involvement of Jews in anti-state activities; and (4) the need for vigilance against citizens who receive packages from abroad.

16. Two Leading Communist Party Organs Improve Distribution. The first issue of Kommunist this year (No. 1, 1962) indicates that the number of copies of that journal now being printed has been increased about 25 percent to 622,200. Kommunist's circulation had remained at about 500,000 for the past two years. The increase in circulation of this leading party organ may be an indication that the Party wants growth in the readership of the journal to keep pace with rising membership in the Party, which is now at about ten million.

Another mainstay of Party propaganda, Pravda, the Central Committee's daily, has improved its system of distribution again by establishing its twenty-second publishing point in the USSR at the city of Voronezh (Pravda, January 13), about 300 miles south of Moscow. Matrices from Moscow are flown to all 22 points where the paper is printed and distributed locally, so that the Party's central organ can avoid the time-lag entailed in printing and shipping of the paper from Moscow.

17. Violence in the USSR: Poachers Shoot Back at the Police. In an article entitled "Pirates", Sel'skaya Zhizn', January 14, publishes an account of the death of a game warden who was shot by poachers on the Caspian Sea. The article provides another of those reminders that violence, always close to the surface in the USSR, and often originating in social unrest and dissatisfaction with living conditions, occasionally erupts in the form of a direct armed clash with authority (WEEKA No. 33, August 18, 1961).

The poacher responsible for the death of the game warden was subsequently sentenced to death, but the Sel'skaya Zhizn' correspondent, writing from Baku,

indicates that the problem for law enforcers is a continuing and tough one. There are just not enough of them, for one thing, and as illustrated by one example he cites, the poachers are prepared to shoot back even at "groups of inspectors."

Illegal fishing on the lower Volga and in the Caspian long has provided the regime with one of its continuing police problems in the southern regions of the USSR, but public admission that the matter has risen from the level of difficult-to-catch scoff-laws to armed encounters with fishermen working illegally to exploit sources of black-market fish is unusual. The episode provides one more example of the pervasive existence of illegal rings established to plug holes in the limping Soviet supply system.

MILITARY

18. AIR. Red Star (Jan.17) carried prominently an article by Col. F. Sverdlof entitled "Tactical Surprise." It is a discussion of the importance of following an initial surprise attack using nuclear rockets with swift and decisive blows to penetrate the enemy rear areas, isolate and destroy remaining forces. Comment: The initial surprise attack by nuclear rockets is not emphasized or discussed, but rather included as the assumed first phase of hostilities.

NAVY. The Naval Attache with two assistants and the Italian Naval Attache visited Sevastopol' on Jan.14, the second time since 1946 that Western attaches have been permitted to visit this "closed" city, headquarters of the Black Sea Fleet.

Atom-Powered Missile Firing Submarines are Main Striking Force of Soviet Navy. Rear-Admiral V. Prokof'yev, writing in Krasnaya Zvezda of Jan.13, states that the main striking force of the Soviet Navy consists of atomic powered, nuclear missile-firing submarines. Comment: Admiral Prokof'yev's emphasis on the SSBN as the current backbone of the Soviet fleet indicates that the Navy intends that the submarine will become a part of the overall strategic strike force.

For the Ambassador:
Boris H. Klosson
Boris H. Klosson
Counselor for Political Affairs

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